Growth and Persistence of Large Business Groups in India by Rajakumar, J. Dennis & Henley, John S.
Growth and Persistence of Large Business 
Groups in India*  
 
by
J. Dennis Rajakumar 
ICFAI Business School, India
John S. Henley
 The University of Edinburgh, UK
The international business literature is belatedly recognizing the significance 
of large family-controlled business groups in emerging markets. Most research 
has focused on analyzing the impact of concentrations of private wealth on eco-
nomic development in home countries using panel data. This paper examines the 
growth and persistence of business groups since 1951 in one country – India. 
Since Independence, the government has attempted to operate an economic policy 
framework that had, amongst its prime objectives, the curbing of the tendency 
of business groups to concentrate economic power. As their growth was seen as 
synonymous with concentration of wealth, business groups became obvious can-
didates for regulation. Various policy instruments were introduced, such as the 
Industries (Development and Regulation) (IDR) Act 1951 and the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act 1969, with the aim of erecting bar-
riers to their growth. In 1991, economic reform ushered in the removal of the 
legislative barriers to business group growth. The analysis in this paper con-
cludes that large business groups expanded their share of wealth between 1951 
and 1969, but this growth was arrested between 1970 and 1990, and since 1991, 
it has dwindled. The pre-eminent position of Tata and Birla, as the two largest 
business groups, remained unchallenged from 1951 until the emergence of the 
Reliance Group in the late 1990s. However, there has been frequent change in 
the relative positions of other groups in and out of the Top-20. After economic 
liberalisation accelerated from 1991, there was significant change in the ranks 
of business groups in the Top-20. Existing smaller groups or newly emerging 
groups, particularly in the IT and telecommunications sectors, have replaced 
many of the previously dominant older groups. This is interpreted as indicating 
the central role of entrepreneurship in combination with technological innova-
tion, and the opening up of the Indian economy to international competition, in 
disturbing established business hierarchies in India. More generally, policy in-
tervention appears to have been less effective in breaking up concentrations of 
economic power in India than economic liberalization and increased competition. 
Introduction
The presence of large business groups in emerging markets has stimulate 
considerable interest in whether their performance has a positive or negative effect 
on the host countries’  general economic performance. Fogel (2006), for example, 
finds that greater oligarchic family control over large corporations is associated 
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with worse economic outcomes, interventionist governments and underdeveloped 
market institutions in a group of 41 countries including India. Khanna and Palepu 
(2000) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) suggest, by contrast, that oligarchic  family 
groups operate efficiently by creating their own internal capital and managerial 
talent markets, functioning largely independently of the institutional environment 
characterised by bureaucracy, ‘red tapeism’ and market failure. This, of course, 
neatly sidesteps the issue of the direction of causality and the extent to which large 
business groups through the process of internalising capital and labour markets 
undermine the weak and inefficient institutional structures of the wider society. It 
seems implausible that large family-controlled business groups will not at times use 
their economic power to protect or enhance their positions. Even if this is not true, 
Morck and Yeung (2004) argue that large firms have significant scale advantages 
in dealing with government. Certainly reducing or eliminating this size advantage 
is one of the key drivers behind the World Bank’s campaign to improve investment 
climates in all countries and for all sizes of firms (World Bank, 2006 & 2007).
From the beginning, the founders of modern India were concerned to ensure 
that the economic system did not concentrate wealth. These concerns are enshrined 
in the Constitution of India which places an obligation on the government of the 
day to control the concentration of wealth and, by implication, the growth of large 
business groups.1
In newly independent India, in the early 1950s, it was feared that the ac-
celerated growth being predicted by economic planners would further concentrate 
economic power. Curbing any such tendency became an integral part of formal 
economic policy. All firms in India were required to operate in a tightly controlled 
and regulated policy environment, exemplified by a complex licensing regime, or 
‘license raj’, the disparaging name it was popularly known by. This obliged firms to 
seek prior permission to issue capital, to raise money from financial institutions and 
to obtain foreign exchange. A high tariff regime was imposed on imported capital 
goods and raw materials. 
The effectiveness of government controls as a means for checking the ac-
cumulation of wealth attracted a wide debate, even among policy makers (GOI, 
1965, pp. 3-10). The Schumpetarian (1934) argument that economic growth re-
quires constant rejuvenation through the destruction of the old and the creation of 
new firms with new technologies was not part of the dominant orthodoxy of the 
day. Nor was the idea that the removal of controls would facilitate the emergence 
of new entrepreneurs and lead to a diminution of concentration accepted in official 
circles. Only in the early 1990s and after a severe financial crisis, did decontrolling 
economic activity become central to economic policies. Since then, the Govern-
ment has initiated wide-scale removal of controls and taken steps to reduce the 
regulatory burden on business. Competition has been increased in the domestic 
market by progressively removing equity caps on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and reducing tariffs on imported goods. 
This paper examines the growth and persistence of large business groups in 
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India under different policy regimes.2 The growth of business groups is analyzed in 
terms of the increase or decrease in their share of four macroeconomic variables. 
These variables are chosen to represent different ways of measuring concentra-
tion.
The paper is divided into two parts. Part One identifies the various phas-
es through which the policy regime to control the growth of business groups has 
evolved between 1951 and 2001. The growth of business groups is then mapped 
across changes in the policy regime. In Part Two, the persistence of large business 
groups is examined. The paper ends with some concluding remarks. 
Part One
Growth of Business Groups, 1951 to 2001: 
For four decades from 1950, the growth of business groups was regulated by 
two principal legislative instruments: the Industries (Development & Regulation) 
(IDR), Act, 1951 and the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 
1969. The IDR Act sought to prevent the concentration of wealth through a com-
prehensive system of licensing. The MRTP Act was designed to regulate the growth 
of assets and market power of business groups. Periodic amendments were made to 
the IDR Act and the MRTP Act was revised in 1982 and 1984.
As part of the economic reforms introduced after 1991, industries were de-
licensed and the threshold limit on assets was repealed. These changes, together 
with relaxation of controls over capital and credit markets, and easing of sector-re-
lated policies, have removed all major policy barriers specifically targeted at large 
business houses. In effect, the government switched to relying on the forces of 
competition to satisfy their obligations under the Constitution to limit concentra-
tions of wealth.
From 1951, three distinct policy regimes regulating business groups can be 
distinguished:
Phase 1: From 1951 to 1969:  Regulation through licensing under the IDR Act 
Phase 2: From 1970 to 1991: Regulation through a combination of licensing 
and the MRTP Act
Phase 3: After 1991:  Enhancement of market efficiency through de-regulation 
and progressive tariff reductions.
Growth of Business Groups Phase 1: 1951 – 1969
This phase covers India’s first three Five-year plans and three successive 
Annual plans. Development strategy during this period was designed to achieve 
higher economic growth, complimented by legislation to prevent concentration of 
wealth. The IDR Act, 1951, empowered the central government to reserve indus-
tries of national importance for the public sector. In other industries, where private 
•
•
•
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firms could participate, the Act required firms to obtain a license to establish any 
new undertaking and seek prior permission to produce any new line or undertake 
any substantial expansion programme (Shaw, 1971). Two other important pieces of 
legislation that sought to reduce concentration of economic power were the Capital 
Issues (Control) Act, 1947, which was intended to ensure wide dispersal of share 
ownership, and the Indian Companies Act, 1956, which restricted inter-corporate 
investment and directorships.  
In order to evaluate whether such policies were effective in curtailing the 
concentration of wealth, the Government constituted four important committees 
in the 1960s.3  Unfortunately, the committees defined business groups in differ-
ent ways and used different parameters to measure concentration levels so making 
comparisons between the committees’ findings is difficult.
The Monopolies Inquiry Commission (MIC) classified a company as being 
part of a business group, if the group had a controlling equity stake of 50 per cent 
or more (GOI, 1965, p.33). The MIC, using an assets threshold of Rs. 5 crore4 or 
more, identified 75 groups (controlling a total of 1536 companies) in 1964 which it 
defined as ‘large business groups’.
In contrast, Hazari (1967, pp. 5-7) argued that a business group could be 
represented by ‘a series of concentric circles’ and so allocated group companies 
between in inner and outer circles. Units assigned to the inner circle had decision-
making powers. Those in the outer circle were companies where the group had 
‘fifty-fifty or minority equity participation’. Hazari identified 20 business groups 
which he referred to as complexes, but did not classify any group as large.  
The Dutt Committee used the criterion of one-third or more of effective eq-
uity, defined as, ‘total equity capital minus holdings by the State-sponsored finan-
cial institutions, Governments, and Non-Resident Indians’ to identify large busi-
ness group-controlled companies (GOI, 1969, pp. 4-15). The Committee then set 
a threshold of assets worth over Rs. 35 crore to identify 73 large business groups 
operating in 1966. 
Hazari (1967) estimated the relative share of Indian business groups by total 
paid-up capital, net fixed assets, net fixed capital stock and gross capital stock, 
while the MIC (1965) used paid-up capital and total assets to classify large business 
groups. The findings of these studies are summarised in Table 1.
As can be seen from Table 1, the share of the top 20 business groups in pri-
vate corporate assets increased during the 1950s. While the share of assets reported 
for the 1960s is not strictly comparable with that of the 1950s due to differences in 
definitions and variables used, there is again a discernible increase in the relative 
share of business groups.5 This was widely attributed to ineffective policy imple-
mentation. For example, the MIC observed that controls actually helped existing 
large firms by restricting the entry of new firms. 
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Table 1: Share of business groups in private corporate assets in India, 1951-1968
Smaller and newer firms, because they had fewer assets of their own, were 
normally exposed to the full rigour of the licensing regime if they wished to under-
take a new venture. Large business groups, by contrast, usually had the required 
financial reserves or in-house capacity to raise finance for new activities. They 
received preferential treatment from the licensing authorities and foreign collabora-
tors were typically eager to participate with them in joint ventures. The Dutt Com-
mittee concluded, “Not only was no attempt made to use licensing to prevent the 
further growth of the Larger Industrial Houses, but the process actually worked in 
their favour” (GOI, 1969, p. 183). The analysis behind this conclusion was influen-
tial in framing the MRPT Act 1969.
Growth of Business Groups Phase 2: 1970 – 1991
This second phase of the analysis covers the period from the fourth to the 
seventh Five-year plan. During this period, the scope of legislation designed to curb 
the increasing concentration of private assets in large business houses was extended 
significantly by the passage of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1969.6  The license raj was also continued through the IDR Act. 
The MRTP Act legislation used both asset and control criteria to classify 
large business groups. It covered undertakings whose assets individually or togeth-
er with the assets of its interconnected undertakings, amounted to Rs. 20 crore or 
more. This limit was raised from Rs. 20 crore to Rs. 100 crore in 1985.7 
The analysis below is based on information reported by the Monopolies 
Research Unit (MRU) in Company News and Notes. The MRU reported the assets 
of business houses, the paid-up capital, turnover and profit before tax (PBT) on a 
regular basis from 1971 until it was discontinued in 2003 with the abolition of the 
Department of Company Affairs.The MRTP Act’s definition of a Large Business 
House (LBH) is followed in the analysis.
 
1951*
1958*
1963-64**
1967-68***
20.44
25.66
16.89
19.62
16.61
19.19
15.17
17.08
37.05
44.85
32.06
36.69
n.a.
n.a.
14.88 (55)
17.08 (53)
n.a.
n.a.
46.94 (75)
53.77 (73)
Years Top 4 Next 16 Top 20 Others All
       Note: 
* Ratio of total gross capital stock of business groups to total gross capital stock of non-Government public 
companies (Hazari, 1967, pp. 36-37).
** Ratio of total assets of the business groups to total assets of all non-Government and non-banking compa-
nies  (GOI, 1965, pp. 119-122).
*** Ratio of total assets of business groups to assets of all non-Government and non-banking companies fol-
lowing the Dutt Committee’s (1969) definition (Datta, 1970b, pp. 3-4).  
n.a. : not available 
Figures in brackets indicate numbers of large business groups  
Journal of Comparative International Management     10:1

In order to work out the share of different groupings of business houses in 
the three variables reported by the MRU, their respective population estimates were 
derived using the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) studies of the finances of both 
public and private limited companies. The RBI statistics are based on a sample of 
companies and so the sample results have to be extrapolated to arrive at aggregate 
values. Population figures for paid-up capital alone are available and so the ratio 
of ‘total paid-up capital of non-Government companies’ to the ‘paid-up capital of 
sample companies’ is used for extrapolation. A linear relationship is assumed to 
exist between the paid-up capital and the extrapolated variables.8  Table 2 presents 
the relative share of large business groups in total assets, turnover, and profit before 
tax (PBT) of the corporate sector. 
As noted above, the asset floor defining a large business house was raised 
from Rs. 20 crore to Rs. 100 crore in 1985. This led to the de-registering of many 
undertakings that belonged to business houses. Sinha et al. (1990, Table 1, p. 2) es-
timate that as many as 309 undertakings were de-registered in 1985, following the 
raising of asset limits. It also resulted in a sharp fall in the number of large business 
groups covered by the MRU, from 157 to 61 between 1984 and 1985. 
From Table 2 and Figure 1, two broad features can be observed. First, be-
tween 1972 and 1984, the share of the Top-20 large business houses in corporate 
India’s total assets declined, while that of other large business groups increased, 
particularly in the second half of the 1970s. Second, between 1985 and 1989, the 
share of large business group assets in total assets of the whole corporate sector 
declined. This suggests that policy measures succeeded in slowing the growth of 
large business groups between 1972 and 1989.
Fig u r e  1 : S h a r e  o f  T o p  2 0  b u s in e s s  g r o u p s  in  to ta l 
a s s e t s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  s e c to r  in  In d ia , 1 9 7 2  -  1 9 8 9
0 .0
5 .0
1 0 .0
1 5 .0
2 0 .0
2 5 .0
3 0 .0
1 9 7 2 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 8
Y e a rs
S h a r e  o f  To p  2 0  L B Hs S h a r e  o f  To p  4  L B Hs
 
Rajakumar and Henley

Table 2: Share of business groups in assets, turnover and profits before tax of the 
private corporate sector in India, 1972-1989
The share of the Top-4 business groups in turnover was approximately the 
same as that of their share in assets, while the next 16 and other large business 
groups had a proportionately higher share in turnover relative to their assets. This 
suggests that new entrants into the ranks of large business groups were either enter-
ing into new areas of economic activity with associated higher turnover per rupee 
of assets or reflects more efficient use of assets. However, an examination of trends 
in share of profits before tax (PBT) indicates that the Top-4 were able to increase 
the share of their operations in the PBT of corporate India. By contrast, large busi-
ness houses outside the Top-20 suffered a significant reduction in their share in 
PBT, even though the number of large business houses above the Rs. 100 crore 
asset threshold, had increased from 47 to 58 between 1985 and 1989.
In summary, the evidence suggests that, while policy instruments may have 
facilitated the emergence of new large business houses, their operations had a lim-
ited impact on the profitability of the Top-20. Indeed, the Top-4 appear to have 
 
Total Assests
1972
1976
1981
1984
1984*
1985
1989
Turnover
1972
1976
1981
1985
1989
Profit before Tax
1972
1976
1981
1985
1989
12.53
11.50
12.29
11.99
11.99
11.53
11.50
11.86
11.31
12.66
11.16
10.62
13.97
14.76
11.39
12.34
15.95
12.69
11.73
11.78
11.25
11.25
11.84
 9.39
13.68
12.65
13.14
12.24
12.60
13.61
12.91
11.58
12.68
10.99
25.22
23.23
24.07
23.24
23.24
23.37
20.89
25.54
23.96
25.80
23.40
23.22
27.58
27.67
22.97
25.02
26.94
14.74 (54)
14.61 (61)
16.54 (81)
18.02 (137)
10.69 (41)
10.81 (47)
  9.45 (58)
17.11
17.83
19.99
11.11
11.05
16.43
15.63
17.70
10.73
 7.91
39.96  (74)
37.84  (81)
40.61  (101)
41.26  (157)
33.93  (61)
34.18  (67)
30.34  (78)
42.65
41.79
45.79
34.51
34.27
44.01
43.30
40.67
35.75
34.85
Years Top 4 Next 16 Top 20 Others All
Note: 
Figures in brackets are the number of large business houses identified under the MRTP Act.
* Based on Annexure II of Ahuja (1986, pp. 4-5)
Source: Company News and Notes, various issues 
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increased their share of the total profits of corporate India between 1985 and 1989, 
although they lost out significantly between 1976 and 1981 to new comers.
Growth of Business Groups Phase 3: After 1990
The year 1991 was a watershed in the history of the corporate sector in 
India. There was a decisive break in the underlying political philosophy behind 
the macroeconomic management of India and the associated microeconomic pol-
icy instruments, from state intervention towards economic liberalization. Reform 
measures, introduced from 1991, removed a large number of regulatory hurdles 
in order to increase competition in the domestic economy. As part of these policy 
changes, the MRTP Act was amended in 1991, abolishing the asset limits on its 
scope. Regulation of market dominance and abuse of market power was extended 
to the operations of all firms.
This section of the paper relies on data extracted from the PROWESS data-
base developed by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). PROW-
ESS contains comprehensive information on firms, including coverage of all known 
affiliates of business groups.9 The CMIE follows a rigorous procedure in identify-
ing an operating unit associated with a particular business group, relying either on 
publicly available information or accounts of management structures as described 
in company annual reports. In this study, after careful scrutiny of the companies 
identified as belonging to each business group in PROWESS, steps were taken to 
cross-reference firm membership with each major business group, to make sure the 
data-set used in the analysis contained all major units of each business group. The 
CMIE’s data-set was found to be reliable in terms of completeness over the time 
period from 1991-92 to 2000-01.10 
Though a wide range of company information is available in PROWESS, 
three variables were selected for the analysis – gross value added, net fixed capital 
stock and market capitalization – for which aggregate estimates are available from 
official publications.  Gross value added11 was chosen as a measure of income and 
is comparable with that of gross domestic product (GDP) as reported in the Na-
tional Accounts Statistics (NAS). 
Net fixed assets were re-valued at company level. To arrive at the total val-
ue for a business group, the assets of group companies were added together. On 
examination of the year of incorporation, unsurprisingly, it was noted that group 
companies were of differing vintages and so net fixed capital stock had to be esti-
mated at the operating unit level. First capital stock was estimated for a chosen base 
year, 1999-200012 and then, using the perpetual inventory method. Such an exercise 
requires a revaluation factor (Rf) for each base year. To calculate this factor, the 
methodology of Srivastava (1996) was followed. It is given by
€ 
Rf =
1+ g( )t+1 −1[ ](1+ π )t 1+ g( ) 1+ π( ) −1[ ]{ }
g 1+ g( ) 1+ π( )[ ]t+1 −1( ){ }
where	g	 = 	growth	rate	of	cpaital	formation
π	 = 	growth	rate	of	the	price	of	capital
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Net fixed capital formation was considered as a measure of capital formation 
and the implicit deflator as the price of capital (Base Year 1993/4 = 100). Following 
the Raj Committee (GOI, 1982: Table VII-1, p. 114), 20 years was considered as 
the average age of net fixed assets. The population net fixed capital stock was that 
of joint stock companies as reported in the NAS. 
Market capitalization was worked out by multiplying ‘closing price of 
shares’ by ‘number of shares in issue’ as on the last trading day of the financial 
year, which is March 31 of every year. Aggregate market capitalization was the 
total capitalization of all companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). 
From Table 3, it can be seen that the relative share of gross value added of 
the Top-50 business groups in GDP has increased by about a third of a percentage 
point. While there was a rise in the share of gross value added to a peak in 1995-6 of 
4.10 per cent of GDP at factor cost, this share has declined steadily since then. Over 
the decade, the overall rise in share has been accounted for by the Top-4 business 
groups, whereas that of the remaining 46 groups has shown a decline, particularly 
since 1996-97.  
Against a background of the Indian economy expanding at nearly 6 per cent 
per annum, the Top-50 business groups’ share of net fixed capital stock has declined 
over the years from 73.7 per cent in 1992 to 41.6 per cent in 2001. Although the 
Top-4 business groups’ share has declined sharply from 39.5 per cent in 1992 to 
23.1 per cent in 2001, they have actually managed to slightly increase their share of 
the diminished share of the Top-50 business groups. This is because there has been 
a dramatic near halving of the shares of the next 16 and the next 30 business groups 
in the net fixed capital stock of all joint stock companies.
As far as the Top-50 large business houses’ share in market capitalization is 
concerned, there is a clearly discernible rise from 32 per cent in 1997 to nearly 40 
per cent in 2001. Closer examination of trends shows that most of the rise in market 
capitalization can be attributed to the performance of the Top-4, which together 
account for nearly a quarter of total market capitalization in 2001 up from 17 per 
cent in 1997. 
The analysis presented above demonstrates that economic liberalization 
– the removal of controls and other entry barriers and increasing domestic com-
petition – has been more effective in dispersing economic concentration than mi-
croeconomic policy interventions, as embodied in the IDR Act, 1951 and MRTP 
Act, 1969, however well-intentioned they may have been. The ensuing expansion 
of the Indian economy, in the 1990s and subsequently, has facilitated the entry and 
growth of many new enterprises, not belonging to already existing large business 
houses. There is also evidence that the momentum of the de-concentration process 
slackened after 1997. The growth in the share of market capitalization of the Top-4 
large business houses does give rise to concern, although 1997 to 2001 was a pe-
riod of considerable turbulence on the Bombay Stock Exchange and so may simply 
represent a short-term flight to quality in a time of uncertainty. 
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Table 3: Percentage share of business groups in macroeconomic indicators, 1991-
92 to 2000-01
The second part of this paper examines in more detail the movement of large 
business groups in and out of the Top-50.
Part 2
The Persistence of Large Business Groups:
This part of the paper is divided into two sections. The first part covers the 
period 1951 to 1990, when the government of India was actively engaged in the 
microeconomic management of the growth of large business houses. The second 
part covers the period from 1991, when the government abandoned direct controls 
 
GDP at Factor Cost*
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-2000
2000-01
 Net Fixed Capital Stock**
(at end of March)
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
BSE Market Capitalization***
(at end of March)
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
1.49
1.48
1.46
1.75
2.02
1.74
1.71
1.64
1.67
1.92
39.5
36.1
35.6
32.3
27.9
24.6
23.4
23.6
24.0
23.1
17.0
13.8
13.4
26.5
23.7
1.01
0.98
1.06
1.13
1.19
1.16
1.12
0.99
0.99
0.88
22.0
19.2
17.4
16.8
14.7
13.5
13.0
12.7
12.8
11.8
 6.1
 6.0
 9.2
 7.6
 7.2
2.50
2.46
2.51
2.88
3.21
2.90
2.83
2.63
2.66
2.84
61.5
55.3
53.0
49.1
42.6
38.1
36.4
36.3
36.8
34.9
23.1
19.8
22.6
34.1
30.9
0.60
0.63
0.64
0.82
0.89
0.84
0.76
0.69
0.68
0.57
12.2
11.2
10.6
 9.9
 8.7
 8.1
 7.8
 7.3
 7.2
 6.7
 8.9
 8.2
11.4
 9.2
 8.9
3.10
3.09
3.15
3.70
4.10
3.74
3.59
3.32
3.34
3.41
73.7
66.4
63.6
59.0
51.3
46.2
44.2
43.7
44.0
41.6
32.0
28.0
34.0
43.3
39.8
Years Top 4 Next 16 Top 20 Next 30 Top 50
Note: 
* Ratio of ‘gross value added of a group’ to GDP at factor cost at current price (with 1993-94 as base year).
** Ratio of ‘net fixed capital stock of a group’ to ‘net fixed capital stock of joint stock companies’ at current 
price (with 1993-94 as base year).
*** Ratio of ‘market capitalization of the listed group companies’ to ‘market capitalization of all companies 
listed’ on the Bombay Stock Exchange.
Sources: For GDP and net fixed capital stock of joint stock companies, GOI (2001 and 2004)  
               For market capitalization of the Bombay Stock Exchange, SEBI (2004)
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in favour of liberalization and progressive opening of the Indian economy to inter-
national investment and competition. 
Trends in Business Group Rankings between 1951 and 1990:
The ranking of the Top-20 business groups in selected years from 1951 to 
1990 is presented in Table 4. The procedure used to obtain these rankings was first, 
the Top-20 groups in 1990 were ranked in ascending order.  Then, their rank in 
earlier years was benchmarked backwards until 1951. This exercise was restricted 
to those business groups that appeared at least once in the Top-20 in any year from 
1951 to 1989.  All rankings are based on total net assets, except for 1951 and 1958 
when gross capital stock was used.
Despite the government’s policy interventions to restrict concentration of 
economic power, it is clear from Table 4 that this did not have the desired impact on 
the growth of very large business groups. For example, the Tata and Birla Groups 
maintained their position in the Top-2 all through the period of regulatory interven-
tion. Moreover, J K Singhania, Thapar, and Mafatlal retained their positions in the 
Top-10 for eighteen years from 1972 to1990. The only major breakthrough into the 
top rank of Indian business houses was that of the Reliance Group, ranked 67th in 
1976, but ranked third after 1986.   
A less stringent test of the impact of the regulatory framework on the growth 
of business groups is to examine movements in and out of the Top-20. Here there 
is more evidence of changes in the ranking of business houses.  For example, of 
the Top-20 in 1951, only eleven groups figure in the Top-20 ranking for 1972 and 
only nine survive into the Top-20 list of 1990. Furthermore, some of the groups in 
the Top-20 of 1990, were late entrants, such as MA Chidambaram that entered in 
1985, Bajaj in 1979 and Modi in 1976. And, finally, most of the new groups, which 
entered after 1971, had moved up into the third quartile by 1989, while well-estab-
lished groups, such as Bangur, Walchand, ACC and Shri Ram were pushed back 
from the top to the bottom half of the Top-20. Several groups belonging to the 
Top-20 in the 1950s and 1960s had disappeared from the Top-50 after 1970. Apart 
from European-controlled groups that were nationalised in the 1970s, notable los-
ers were Indra Singh, Seshasayee, and Shapoorji.
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Table 4: The Top-20 large business groups, 1951 to 1990
 
Birla
Tata
Reliance
JK Singhania
Thapar
Mafatlal
Bajaj
Modi
Larsen & Toubro
MA Chidambaram
TVS Iyengar
Hindustan Lever
ACC
Shri Ram
ITC
United Breweries
ICI
Bangur
Kirloskar
Walchand
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
29
28
78
36
33
25
38
32
69
50
22
48
19 18
8
13
16
22
16
19
9
5
11
20
14
10
11
16
18
20
14
15
20
17
3
11
13
7
16
18
16
17
18
15
3
14
11
6
13
19
16
13
3
7
8
10
14
17
18
20
16
11
20
3
4
5
7
14
15
17
18
19
9
14
3
4
5
6
17
15
16
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
10
7
8
9
15
18
11
14
16
20
12
17
13
2
1
11
4
5
3
20
15
19
17
14
6
12
7
9
10
2
1
67
4
6
3
18
14
66
17
12
10
7
8
13
15
2
1
8
4
3
15
17
6
9
19
5
7
13
12
2
1
12
9
4
8
6
5
19
10
2
1
12
5
7
8
10
20
4
9
2
1
9
6
15
30
55
27
5
12
19
4
36
11
2
1
10
9
12
8
6
19
13
2
1
10
12
8
7
13
18
11
Name of Business Group 1990 1986 1981 1976 1972 1968 1966 1964 1958 1951
Other groups that made into the Top-20 at least once
Mahindra & Mahindra
Sarabhai
Ashok Leyland
Scindia
Oil India
Chowgule
Bhiwandiwala
Kasturbhai Lalbhai
Khatau
Macneil & Magor
Parry
Martin Burn
Sahu Jain
Bird Heilgers
Surajmull Nagarmull
Esso
Goenka
Andrew Yule
Killicks
Kilachand
Ramakrishna
Indra Singh
Seshayee
Shapoorji
Notes:
Groups reported for 1951 and 1958 follow definitions by Hazari (1967), for 1964 as defined by MIC (GOI, 
1965), and for 1966 and 1968 as defined by the Dutt Committee (GOI, 1969).
Groups such as Bird Heilgers and Andrew Yule were European-controlled and Martin Burn was partly 
European Controlled (Hazari, 1967, p. 21). The government nationalised the Andrew Yule and Martin Burn 
groups in the early seventies and management of many companies belonging to the Bird Heilgers group also 
came under government control as a result of financial difficulties (Chandra, 1981, p. 332). Macneil & Magor, 
another European-controlled group, had most of its assets taken over by RP Goenka.
Sources: For 1951 and 1958, Hazari (1967, p. 17). 
For 1964, GOI (1965, pp. 119-122).
For 1966 and 1968, Datta (1970b, pp. 7-8). 
For other years, Company News & Notes, various issues.
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Table 5 summarises the overall movement of business groups in and out of 
the Top-20 by comparing movements over a one year time period for various years 
from 1972 to 1989. 
Table 5: Changes in the ranking of business groups, 1972-1989
The data confirms that the proportion of business groups in the Top-20 re-
taining their rank from one year to the next increases between 1972 and 1989. 
Conversely more business groups drop out of the Top-20 in the earlier years. This 
implies that the large business groups were beginning to accumulate sufficient mar-
ket power and assets to protect their positions of dominance in the Indian economy 
by the latter half of the 1980s.
Trends in Business Group Rankings after 1990:  
Since the mid-1980s, India’s Top-3 business houses have remained Reli-
ance,13 Tata14 and Birla15  (Table 6). However, a major change has been the dis-
placement of the Tata Group from the top position by the Reliance Group (Am-
bani). Lower down the rankings, six business groups have moved out of the Top-20 
between 1991-92 and 2000-01. On a year-on-year basis, there is noticeably greater 
churn in business groups moving in and out of the Top-20 by comparison with the 
period 1972 to 1990 (Table 7).16  
Closer examination of the companies moving into the Top-20 reveals the 
increasing prominence of groups heavily involved in the new economy, especially 
software-related businesses and telecommunications. A few of the older groups 
have moved up the rankings by exploiting new market opportunities. For example, 
Bajaj, Hero and TVS have all contributed to and benefited from the phenomenal 
growth in the demand for two wheelers from an increasingly affluent urban popula-
tion in the 1990s.
 
Many of the business opportunities realised by rising large business groups 
are in part a product of the easing of controls over sector-related policies, such as, 
controls on the importation of computer hardware and telecommunications equip-
ment. This relaxation of controls has enabled business groups such as WIPRO and 
HCL to exploit information technology and to operate in the global market place 
Top-20 Large Business Groups  
Years Retained rank  Moving  up  Moving dow n Dropped  out  
 
1989 a 11  5 4 0 
1986 a 9 5 5 1 
1981 a 9 3 6 2 
1976 a 5 3 9 3 
1972 a 5 7 2 6 
     
 Note: Movements are calculated by comparison with the immediately preceding year 
Source: a Company News & Notes, various issues.
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Na me of the Group  2000 -01  1995 -96  1991 -92  
Reliance Group [Ambani] 1 3 3 
Ta ta Group 2 1 1 
Birla Group 3 2 2 
Larsen & Toubro Group 4 5 6 
T.V. S. Iyengar Group 5 8 10  
RP G Ent erprises Group 6 4 8 
WIPRO  Group 7 46  45  
Mah indra &  Mahindra Group 8 10  15  
Bajaj Group 9 6 7 
Om P rakash Jindal Group 10  23  39  
Essar (Ru ia) Group 11  11  19  
J.K.  Singhan ia Group 12  9 5 
Videocon Group 13  35  33  
HC L Group 14  36  31  
Her o (Mun jals) Group 15  43  40  
Ch idam baram M.A. Group 16  13  13  
Muru gappa Chettiar Group 17  20  14  
DCM Group 18  16  21  
Tha par Group 19  7 4 
Ban gur Group 20  22  17  
Oth er Groups that made  the Top-20 at  lea st on ce 
ACC  Group 21  14  9 
Esc orts Group 22  15  20  
Nagarjun a Group 23  17  47  
God rej Group 24  28  23  
Wadia (Bombay Dyeing) Group 26  19  16  
Wi lliams on Ma gor  Group 28  27  18  
Modi  Umesh  Kumar 30  21  12  
Kirloskar Group 31  18  27 
Lalbhai Group 45  18  22  
Arvind M afatlal Group 46  12  11  
 Source: PROWESS
Table 6: The Top-20 Large Business Groups, 1991-02 to 2000-01
(Based on relative shares in GDP)
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where demand for software services originates. Other groups, such as Hero and 
TVS, rely more on domestic demand, while the easing of policies has allowed them 
to obtain the necessary technology through collaboration agreements with foreign 
partners, mostly from Japan. 
Similarly, the de-reservation of certain strategic sectors like oil exploration 
and refining, petrochemicals, steel and telecommunications, which used to be the 
exclusive monopoly of the public sector until 1991, has also helped a few already 
large business houses to move away from their earlier core businesses and grow 
even larger. Thus the rapid growth of the Reliance Group, in the 1990s, owes more 
to its diversification into petroleum refining and petrochemical production than its 
original core business as a textile house and its bedrock in the 1970s and 1980s.
Economic growth stimulated by the reforms introduced after 1991 has also 
created new business opportunities. As domestic demand has grown, liberalization 
has encouraged market-seeking foreign investors to form alliances with business 
groups, thereby changing the profile of associated business groups in India. Though 
the very large business houses of the ‘old regime’ continue to become stronger, 
including  through investing heavily in the new economy, economic reform has 
certainly facilitated the growth of new business groups.  It has also reduced the 
relative performance of some of the older groups.
The survival, and indeed reconfiguration and expansion, of some of the old 
business groups testify to the persistence of entrepreneurship in India even in a 
highly restrictive business climate. Had Indian business groups grown only by de-
riving benefits from a restrictive and protective policy regime, they would not have 
survived or flourished in the competitive post-1991 business climate, nor would 
they be as prominent as they are today. The reform process has opened up new op-
portunities for growth, which were recognized and exploited by business groups. 
Entrepreneurship may have been seriously distorted by the license raj regime but it 
survived. The decline of some previously dominant business groups and the emer-
2000 -01  3 8 9 - 
1999 -20 00 5 10  4 1 
1998 -99  7 4 5 4 
1997 -98  6 4 6 4 
1996 -97  4 5 5 6 
1995 -96  5 5 4 6 
1994 -95  6 5 3 6 
1993 -94  5 4 6 5 
1992 -93  5 5 5 5 
 
Years Retained rank Moving up Moving down Moved out
Top-20 Large Business Groups
Note: The comparison for each year is with the immediately preceding year. 
Source: PROWESS
Table 7: Changes in the ranking of business groups, 1991-92 to 2000-01
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gence of new ones lend credence to Schumpeter’s remarks on the rise and fall of 
the entrepreneurial class: 
“... the entrepreneurial function is not only the vehicle of continual reorga-
nization of the economic system but also the vehicle of continued changes in the 
elements which comprise the upper strata of society. The successful entrepreneur 
rises socially, and with him his family, who acquire from the fruits of his success 
a position not immediately dependent upon personal conduct. This represents the 
most important factor of rise in the social scale in the capitalist world. Because it 
proceeds by competitively destroying old businesses and hence the existence of 
people dependent upon them, there always corresponds to it a process of decline, 
or loss of caste, or elimination. … This is not only because all individual profits dry 
up, the competitive mechanism tolerating no permanent surplus values, but rather 
annihilating them by means of just this stimulus of the striving for profit which is 
the mechanism’s driving force; but also because in the normal case things so hap-
pen that entrepreneurial success embodies itself in the ownership of a business.” 
(Schumpeter, 1934: pp.155-156)
Conclusions
This paper has examined the growth of Indian business groups in terms of 
the increase or decrease in the relative shares of business groups in some important 
macroeconomic indicators. Paradoxically, it was found that the Top-20 business 
groups grew between 1951 and 1969, even though the licensing regime was argu-
ably at its most restrictive. However, this growth was arrested during the following 
period, from 1970 to 1991, when both licensing and controls over assets under the 
MRTP Act were in force. Since 1991 and the repeal of restrictive legislation, there 
has been a decline in the growth of some business groups together with consolida-
tion of the position of the Top-3 large business houses – Reliance, Tata and Birla. 
The paper then evaluated the persistence of business groups by analyzing 
changes in the ranking of individual groups. After 1991, it was observed that, ex-
cept for the top three groups, there was considerable churning in the ranking of the 
remaining Top-20 business groups. A few of the highly ranked groups from before 
1991 have survived in the Top-20 in 2000-01 but they do not retain their earlier and 
higher ranked positions.  
The growth and decline of large business houses in India appears to be an 
evolutionary process. Many well-known groups of the 1950s could not survive in 
the 1960s, and hitherto unranked groups have surged ahead in the 1970s and 1980s. 
During the 1990s, while the Top-3 very large business groups have increased their 
market capitalization, new or already existing smaller groups have generally re-
placed erstwhile dominant groups. An important feature of this evolution is that 
large business groups together still define the landscape of wealth accumulation 
in India. 
 
Inevitably, this leads to the question of whether such groups contribute to-
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wards the concentration of wealth in the economy, as was widely believed at the 
time of drafting the Indian Constitution. It remains an important question but can-
not be answered without systematic analysis of the decision making and gover-
nance structures of large business groups which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Endnotes
*We would like to thank the Charles Wallace India Trust for providing the CWIT Visiting Fellowship that en-
abled Dr Rajakumar to visit the University of Edinburgh and complete this paper. We wish to thank Dr. M. 
Vijayabaskar for the useful comments received on an earlier version of the paper.
1 
Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution reads as follows: “.. the State shall, in particular direct its policy to-
wards securing – (1) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed 
as best to sub-serve the common goal; and (2) that the operation of the economic system does not result in con-
centration of wealth and the means of production to the common detriment” (Cited in Datta, 1970a, p. 27).
2
 In this paper, the terms large business group and large business house (LBH) are used interchangeably.
3
 These included Mahalanobis Committee in 1960, the Monopoly Inquiry Commission (GOI, 1965), Hazari 
Committee (GOI, 1966), and Dutt Committee (GOI, 1969).  
4
 Rs. 1 Crore equals Rs. 10 million 
5
 Also see Goyal (1970) and Chandra (1981).
6
 The preamble to the MRTP Act states that  its objectives are: “(a) that the operation of the economic system does 
not result in the concentration of economic power, to the common detriment, (b) control of monopolies and (c) 
prohibition of monopolistic and restrictive trade practices” (Cited in Ahuja, 1986, p. 1). The Act sought to control 
both assets and market dominance. However, Sinha, Behari, and Jhangiani, (1990) show that the regulation of 
undertakings was more due to the size of their assets than any assessment of their market dominance. The MRTP 
Act’s definition of a Large Business House (LBH) is followed in the analysis of the growth of business groups 
from 1970-1991reported in this paper.
7
 The asset limit of Rs. 20 crore remained unchanged until 1985, despite significant inflation in the country. This 
became a contentious issue for industrialists. Though industry representatives submitted a memorandum to raise 
the limit to Rs. 50 crore, the Sachar Committee did not find it necessary to raise the limit (GOI, 1978, p. 303).The 
Nanda Study Group, the following year, proposed that the asset limit was anyway irrelevant in an inflationary 
environment and instead, suggested using market dominance as the criterion for coverage of the MRTP Act (GOI, 
1979, p. 32). While reinstating the use of the asset criterion, the Narasimham Committee suggested raising the 
limit to Rs. 75 crore, despite industry representatives suggesting  a floor of Rs. 100 crore (GOI, 1985, p. 7).
8
 This methodology is widely used for building up population estimates such as for private corporate investment 
and savings, and net fixed capital stock of joint stock companies (GOI, 1999). Rajakumar (2003) has argued that 
population estimates are very sensitive to the extrapolation factors used.
9
 Shanta and Rajakumar (1999) discuss the unique features of PROWESS compared with other major sources of 
data on the corporate sector in India. 
10
 The CMIE updates PROWESS as and when new information about a company is available. The present analy-
sis uses data available up to August, 2005. We do not rule out the possibility of the exclusion of a few companies 
from the business groups identified by PROWESS. 
11
 It is the sum of:  (a) salaries, wages and bonuses, (b) provident fund, (c) employee welfare expenses, (d) 
managerial remuneration, (e) rent paid net of rent received, (f) interest paid net of interest received, (g) tax 
provisions, (h) dividends paid net of dividends received, (i) retained profit net of non-operating surplus/deficit, 
and (j) depreciation. 
12
 The year 1999-2000 was chosen as the base year because every company had reported net fixed assets for 
that year.
13
 Reliance owes its growth to the unparalleled entrepreneurship of its founder the late Dhirubhai Ambani. (Pi-
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ramal, 1996, pp.164-174).  The group has been split between the two sons of Dhirubhai Ambani, since his death. 
The elder son, Mukesh Ambani, has retained control of  the former flagship company of the group, known as 
Reliance Industries Limited, which is the largest company operating in the petroleum refining and petrochemi-
cals sectors in India, along with other companies. The younger son, Anil Ambani, has retained Reliance Energy, 
which is significant in the power sector, Reliance Infocomm, which is a major mobile phone and telecommunica-
tions company and Reliance Capital. 
14
 Tata Group is managed by Tata Sons, which is a private holding company of the many group companies and 
is partly owned by those companies as well. The Tata Group is the only top business group that has a presence in 
almost every area of economic activity: Tata Steel (formerly TISCO), Tata Motors (formerly TELCO), Taj Hotels 
which has a presence in all major Indian cities, Tata Teleservices, a large telecommunications company own-
ing mobile phone franchises under the brand Tata Indicom, Tata Power, Tata Tea and Tata Consultancy Service 
(TCS), the largest software company in India.
15
 Birla Group was split up among family members with the Aditya Birla Group becoming the largest business 
group. Kumaramangalam Birla, the only son of the founder Aditya Birla, now manages the Aditya Birla Group. 
 
16
 Hindustan Lever, ITC and ICI are not included in the data set because PROWESS does not report these com-
panies  as Large Business Houses.  
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